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Abstract: The sheepskin market in Ethiopia seems to have enjoyed the benefits of the 
economic liberalization policy since 1991, such as price deregulation and liberalization 
of economic activities. Close observation of the profiles and activities of the participants 
in the marketing channel, however, demonstrates that they have tried to complement a 
lack of appropriate infrastructure and legal protection, which should be provided by the 
government, by utilizing their social and blood ties. While these ties have implemented 
the role of the government, there are risks that the marketing channel might be 
developed on the basis of a coalition with social networks, and that the poor outside the 
networks would be excluded. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took political power 
from the socialist regime (1974–91) in 1991 and has pursued an economic liberalization 
policy since then.1 While previous research has responded positively to the effects of 
liberalization of various agricultural product markets in terms of producer price, market 
efficiency and the development of private traders, some studies have pointed out that the 
lack of appropriate infrastructure and an imperfect market have caused inefficiencies in 
the marketing of agricultural products (Alemayehu 1994; Bekele and Mulat 1995; 
Kuma and Mekonnen 1995). 
The marketing of sheepskins has also been liberalized in tandem with other 
agricultural commodities. Although skins and hides are Ethiopia’s second largest export 
item after coffee, they have not been given much attention by academic researchers, 
probably owing to their relatively small export value share at 7 to 21 percent, compared 
with the dominant share of coffee at 44 to 76 percent (1979–98 figures: see Customs 
Authority 1990, 1996, 1998), and their unique character as the by-product of meat 
slaughter and an item of supplementary income for farmers. Therefore, while several 
studies on the technical improvements in skins and hides have been conducted, the 
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 function and efficiency of their marketing channel have not been explored in detail.  
This paper has two objectives: first, to outline the contemporary situation of the 
Ethiopian skins and hides market, especially focusing on sheepskin, which has 
accounted for 64 to 85 percent of skins and hides export value (1994–8 figures: see 
Customs Authority 1998). The second objective is to analyse the effects of the economic 
liberalization policy on the market and the strategies developed by the participants in 
the marketing channel.  
The paper consists of three parts: (1) research methods and area descriptions; (2) 
overview of the sheepskin marketing channel; and (3) analysis of the effects of the 
liberalization policy and the strategies developed by the participants. 
 
1. RESEARCH METHOD AND AREA PROFILE 
Research method 
The research was conducted basically through face-to-face and date-to-date interviews 
in the period 1997–2000.2 The research in the first year of 1997 focused on tannery 
plant visits and interviews with skins and hides merchants in the Amhara Region, where 
the biggest volume of sheepskins is produced, and in the Gedeo Zone of the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region, where the biggest volume of cowhides by 
zone is produced.3 The Gedeo Zone was selected for the purpose of comparison 
between cowhides and sheepskins.4 The author interviewed 15 tanneries, which 
included all the tanneries in operation during the research period, and around 75 skin 
and hide merchants5 (see details in Tables 1 and 2). 
 
Tables 1 and 2 near here 
  
In the second and third year of 1998–9 the research activities were mainly conducted 
in an area as outlined below for gathering time series data and more detailed 
information. The final research on sheepskin marketing was conducted for one month in 
April–May 2000 to gather additional information and complete missing data. 
 
The research area in 1998–9 
 
Fig. 1 near here 
 
The research was conducted mainly in the South Gondar Zone, Amhara Region. The 
researched woreda, called Estie, is located 110 km east of Bahir Dar, the capital of the 
Amhara Region, and 50 km south of Debre Tabor, the capital of the South Gondar Zone 
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 (Fig. 1). The altitude is about 2300 m above sea level, equal to that of Addis Ababa. The 
specific research locations were the woreda town (Estie) and a small qebele town called 
Jib Asra, 15 km distant.  
As mentioned above, the Amhara Region produces the biggest volume of sheepskins 
and also some of the highest-quality skins. The shipment of sheepskins to Addis Ababa 
from the South Gondar Zone accounts for approximately 8 percent of the total of the 
Amhara Region, and the research area of the Estie woreda provides about 20 percent of 
the total Zone shipment.6 The criteria for the selection of a research area included level 
of infrastructure for communication and transportation, with a preference for an area 
with poor infrastructure in order to measure the effects of the economic liberalization 
policy on the rural poor. 
Although the Estie woreda is regarded as a ‘rich’ crop surplus area, its infrastructure 
remains rudimentary. There used to be an electric power generator, but it has been 
broken for a long time; there is a telecommunications branch office, but the equipment 
has often not worked. There are usually three buses per day to Bahir Dar, a journey of 
four hours, but during the rainy season the road becomes very muddy and the number 
decreases to one bus per day, or none. 
The populations of the woreda total, the woreda town and the qebele town were 
312,294, 11,565, and 1,026 respectively.7 The society in the woreda is homogeneous 
since: (1) the mother tongue of 99.9 percent of residents is the Amhara language; (2) 
96.5 percent are Ethiopian Orthodox Church Christians and only 3.5 percent are 
Muslim;8 and (3) 96.4 percent are living in the rural area (CSA 1995b, c). The other 
feature of this area is its highly sedentary residents.  
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE MARKETING CHANNEL FOR SHEEPSKINS   
Changes in the sheepskin marketing channel after liberalization 
The basis of the sheepskin marketing channel has not changed drastically from the 
previous socialist regime to the current EPRDF regime except in the numerical increase 
of the participants. In both regimes, private merchants have been the main participants 
(Fig. 2). The main changes in the sheepskin marketing channel are: (1) price 
deregulation; (2) the liberalized marketing policy in terms of traders; and (3) the 
liberalized industrial policy in terms of tannery plants. 
 
Fig. 2 near here 
 
Price liberalization since 1990 has made the skins and hides business attractive for 
merchants since the domestic prices have increased more than the inflation rate, mainly 
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 owing to the devaluation of Ethiopian birr against the US dollar,9 and the upward trend 
in international prices in 1993–6. The unit value of sheepskin exports in 1996 rose to 
more than twice the pre-liberalization value of 1990, while the inflation rate increased 
only by 29 per cent in the same period (Customs Authority 1990, 1996; NBE 1998). The 
period has been characterized by fierce competition between merchants as the supply of 
skins has not increased, since sheepskins are still produced only after slaughter for meat 
(see Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3 near here 
 
Salt has long been used as a guarantee of contracts between tannery and wholesaler, 
and between wholesaler and collector. Once one party receives salt from the other, 
he/she must provide his/her products to the person who gave the salt, although it is easy 
to change business partner after completing the contract. While salt is used as the 
symbolic contract fulfilment, it also helps in practical terms of quality improvement 
through encouraging appropriate preservation of sheepskins, since salt is critical for the 
process and salt-takers can use as much salt as they need.10 In real terms, salt-takers can 
save money on salt, which usually costs 70 birr/100 kg.11 
 
The characteristics of sheepskins as a product and a commodity 
Sheepskin has unique characteristics as a commodity when compared to other 
agricultural products. The first is that sheepskin is a by-product of meat. The volume of 
skins and hides is determined by meat consumption. A meat diet is, however, not 
common among the peasants, especially the Orthodox Christians whose religious 
precepts ordain about 180 days of no-meat fasting in a year if strictly followed (Aymro 
and Joachim 1970: 63–4). Therefore the supply of sheepskins is concentrated on periods 
of festivities. In the Amhara region, where more than 80 percent of the population are 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians (CSA 1995a), the supply of sheepskins comes in three 
major waves: (1) Easter (April or May), (2) the Ethiopian New Year and Mesqal 
(September), and (3) Christmas and Timqat (January).  
The second characteristic is that suppliers, who are mostly farmers, cannot preserve 
the skins themselves. Suppliers can keep sheepskins for at most two or three days, while 
merchants and tanneries can preserve skins for three months using salt.12 Suppliers 
therefore cannot stockpile skins until the price increases. 
The third characteristic follows on from the nature of sheepskins as an export 
commodity. It is difficult for suppliers and even merchants to forecast the future price 
trend of sheepskins since the domestic price has been basically determined by the 
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 international price and therefore lacks a relationship with domestic supply and demand. 
Ethiopian sheepskin is a ‘price taker’ owing to its small share at less than 1 percent of 
the world market (UNCTAD 1995: 220–1) and the low local consumption at less than 
30 percent.13   
It is assumed that these characteristics magnify the defects of infrastructure of 
transportation and information-sharing, from which markets in Ethiopia are suffering. 
The following sections analyse how each participant in the sheepskin marketing channel 
has developed a survival strategy under the liberalization policy. 
 
3.  THE SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF PARTICIPANTS IN SHEEPSKIN 
MARKETING14 
Private tannery plants15 and their relationship with wholesale merchants 
The abolition of the upper limit on private capital in 1990 (Special Decree No. 17/90) 
and the international price increase in sheepskins in the early 1990s encouraged the new 
entry of private tanneries. While only six government-owned tanneries and two private 
tanneries had been operated during the previous regime, as of 2000, there were four 
government-owned tanneries, two privatized and nine private tanneries, and a further 30 
tanneries which were awaiting the issuing of licences16 (Ethiopian Herald, 25.12.1998). 
Despite the increasing number, the scale of private tanneries was much smaller than 
that of the government-owned tanneries. The value share of private tanneries was only 
23 percent of the total gross value of production in the 1996/97 Ethiopian fiscal year.17 
The value added per plant of private tanneries was also less than 60 percent of the 
government-owned figure, and the capital investment and number of employees per 
plant were also very small, at half and 20 percent of the government plant figures, 
respectively (CSA 1998b) (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 near here  
  
The small scale and short history of private tanneries caused them difficulties in 
gaining customers. Interviews with skins and hides merchants indicated that they were 
reluctant to start business with private tanneries. Although 17 out of 43 wholesale 
merchants interviewed had some business with private tanneries, four out of the 17 kept 
up their relationship with the government or privatized plants as well, and the other nine 
out of the 17 were close family relatives of the owner of a private tannery. Only four out 
of 43 decided to restrict their business to private tanneries. This revealed a scepticism of 
merchants about private tanneries.18 The government-owned tanneries have major 
advantages over private tanneries in that they are guaranteed by the government and 
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 their stability has been proven over time.  
Some of the merchants commented on the difficulties in relying on private tanners 
who suddenly approached them to sell their sheepskins. One of the merchants even 
mentioned the possibility of changing his customer from a privatized tannery to other 
government-owned tanneries since this plant was owned by an Arab enterprise and he 
felt uneasy about relying on it. Others commented that they preferred government plants 
since they were not so strict on demanding quality in sheepskins as the private tanneries 
although the price was lower than that offered by the latter. 
Given the poor infrastructure in communications and the lack of an effective legal 
system to enforce payment to merchants by tanneries and preventing cheating and 
collusion, it is critical for tanneries to build up trust with merchants. As a first step, they 
utilized their local connections to compensate for a lack of credibility. Based on 
interviews in various areas in the Amhara Region, three private tanneries, which had 
customers there, had some connection with the area. All of the owners were Amhara by 
ethnic group, and two of three had their plants in the Amhara region (tanneries J and M 
in Table 1). The location was important not only for the saving on transportation costs 
since it was on the route to the export port in Djibouti, but also to absorb the sheepskin 
supply from the area surrounding the plants.    
In addition, a high transportation cost also counts against switching to a new tannery. 
Merchants living in an area tend to prefer the same tannery, not only for the local 
connection, but also for the pragmatic reason of minimizing their transport costs. Often 
small-scale merchants without their own truck, lacking the capital to purchase skins for 
one truckload (6000–8000 skins per truck), share a rental truck for shipping sheepskins. 
That means they must ship their skins to the same tannery, and consequently all the 
merchants chose the same tanneries. It is thus not practicable for one merchant to make 
new arrangements. This trend was observed in the most areas visited. 
In the Estie woreda, the marketing channel of sheepskins has developed through the 
links offered by social and blood ties between wholesale merchants and a tannery 
(tannery H in Table 1).19 Tannery H has business with all the wholesale merchants in 
Estie woreda. The tannery is located in Addis Ababa but the owner is Amhara and 
originally from Estie woreda. Five out of ten wholesalers are related by marriage with 
the plant owner’s sisters.20 The relatives started their business when the plant owner 
began to export raw skins. After the export ban,21 they did business with 
government-owned tanneries. They changed to tannery H when its owner started up his 
plant in 1990. 
This kind of relationship has advantages both for the tannery plant and the wholesale 
merchants. For tanneries, it guarantees a stable source of supply and quality control of 
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 sheepskins through the ascertained marketing channel. For wholesalers the marketing 
channel certifies the payment and stable purchasing from the tannery without fear of 
plant closure.  
Furthermore wholesalers can receive reliable market information from the tannery on 
future price trends. This is critical since wholesalers lack any sources of information on 
the international price and the tannery does not guarantee a fixed purchasing price. It 
buys sheepskins based on the international price at the time of wholesalers’ ‘delivery’, 
not at the time of wholesalers’ purchase. There is usually a time lag of around two to 
three months for delivery from merchants to the plant since wholesale merchants have 
to keep the skins stored in salt until a large enough number has accumulated for truck 
transportation. It means the risks of international price changes are shared between a 
tannery plant and the merchants. This is another reason why the merchants are very 
careful in choosing the plant to do business with. The tannery plant frequently gave 
purchasing price information to the wholesale merchants, and the wholesaler purchased 
sheepskins from suppliers and collectors using this information. 
 
The relationship of wholesale merchants and collectors22 
The increase in numbers of merchants since liberalization has led to fierce competition 
among wholesalers and collectors alike. For example, in the research area, three out of 
ten merchants in Estie town and six out of eight in the Jib Asra qebele were new 
participants in the sheepskin market after 1991 (see Tables 4 and 5). In addition to the 
registered merchants, during times of increasing prices, short-term illegal merchants 
added to the competition. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 near here 
 
 The differences between wholesalers and collectors 
There is no difference in legal restriction on the activities of wholesalers and collectors. 
Wholesale merchants can purchase sheepskins directly from suppliers. Government 
regulation of wholesalers and collectors differs only by the issuing of a licence for the 
purpose of taxation. A collector is categorized as a retailer. Qualification as a retailer or 
a wholesale merchant is determined with reference to a capital floor of 5000 birr at the 
time of initial application for the registration. Tax rates differ: when collectors expand 
their business to ship sheepskins to a tannery plant, the woreda office would warn them 
to change their status from retailer to wholesaler. Usually both wholesalers and 
collectors have other jobs, such as milling, gasoline selling and running small shops. 
This is because: (1) these other jobs are necessary to minimize the risks arising from the 
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 sheepskin trade, and (2) only persons who are successful in other jobs can afford to 
participate in the risky sheepskin trade. 
 
The relationship between wholesalers and collectors 
Wholesalers and collectors do not have to build close relationships, compared to those 
between plants and wholesalers. Collectors have good access to several merchants in a 
woreda town and it is easy to compare prices offered. Collectors are mostly living in 
rural areas but within two to seven hours’ walk,23 while the distance between plants and 
merchants might be a two-day trip by truck, and the tanneries often require a large 
quantity of skins, and at least one truckload.  
Collectors have received salt for skin preservation beforehand from wholesalers, who 
received it in turn from tanneries. The salt becomes the guarantee of a contract. 
Collectors claim that they have no problems in switching customers if they have not yet 
received any salt. It is, however, difficult to discern the truth, since wholesalers in the 
woreda town usually offer the same price as a result of the competition between them. 
Although four out of eight collectors in Jib Asra qebele are relatives of a wholesaler in 
Estie woreda, in the majority of collectors in other qebeles visited (Jaragado and Qoma 
Fasiladas qebele) there are few relatives of the wholesalers.  
 
Payment from wholesalers to collectors 
The wholesale merchants do not fix the purchasing price for collectors. Instead, they 
pay a commission fee of 1 to 2 birr per skin to collectors and the ‘present’ supplier’s 
price, which means the price at the time of the ‘delivery’, not at the time of the 
collector’s purchase. The risks from the international price fluctuation are considerable: 
during the research period between January 1998 and May 1999, the suppliers’ price 
fluctuated by more than six times, between 4 and 26 birr in the Estie woreda. This 
payment system shared the risks between them.  
In consequence the commission fee is somewhat tricky considering the price 
fluctuation. It, however, still works since it would be a big incentive in the case of a 
price increase and some compensation for collectors in case of a price decrease. In case 
of no price change, it would be indispensable for the collectors to purchase skins from 
suppliers in competition not only with other collectors, but also with wholesalers. In any 
event wholesalers have to offer collectors a commission to encourage collectors to work 
for them. 
 
The social and religious background of merchants 
In Estie woreda, all the merchants, both wholesalers and collectors, are originally from 
 8
 the surrounding areas of Estie town.24 All are Orthodox Christians, who make up the 
majority of the residents. There were no Muslim sheepskin merchants in the Estie 
woreda, although there were some in other areas, such as Dessie in South Wollo and 
Woldiya in North Wollo, where Muslims in these zones constitute 70 percent and 17 
percent of the total population, respectively (CSA 1995a). The lack of Muslim 
sheepskin merchants in Estie woreda probably derives from the segregated daily lives of 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims,25 and it is only so in the case of sheepskins. There 
are Muslim merchants for other commodities, such as crops and honey. Interviews with 
the Muslim residents revealed that they were reluctant to enter the sheepskin market 
owing to a lack of knowledge both of the techniques and marketing. Muslim merchants 
and the plant owner, who is an Orthodox Christian, might have difficulties in building a 
close partnership between them. As mentioned in the following section, the weak social 
ties between the Muslims and suppliers, who are mostly Orthodox Christians, might 
also deter them from trying to enter the sheepskin market. 
 
 Farmers as suppliers: The relationship with merchants 
The effects of the liberalization policy on the suppliers’ price of sheepskins26 
The price liberalization, together with the devaluation of the Ethiopian birr, has raised 
the standard price of sheepskins and brought the flexible price fluctuation in line with 
international prices. In the research area, the suppliers’ price at Easter in the three 
consecutive years from 1998 to 2000 showed a big fluctuation that closely traced the 
international price change (see Figs 4 and 5). 
 
Figs 4 and 5 near here 
 
But price movement assuming a market functioning as a ‘perfect market’ is 
contradictory to the market conditions in Ethiopia’s poor infrastructure and the weaker 
position of sheepskin suppliers than merchants, as explained above. Specifically, the 
price in 1999 caught up with the level of 1997, even after a depressed price in 1998. It 
implies fair competition without collusion among wholesalers of whom more than half 
are closely related.27 The next section investigates some possibilities of the function of 
social ties, which have brought some negotiating power to suppliers over merchants in 
sheepskin market.  
 
The profile of suppliers 
Peasants supply most of the sheepskins in the Amhara region, where 93 percent of the 
population are engaged in the agricultural sector (CSA 1995b). The suppliers sell skins 
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 to local collectors immediately after the slaughter owing to the short preservation period 
and the fact that sheepskins are by-products of slaughter for meat, as mentioned 
previously. Compared to other agricultural commodities with significant input costs 
already committed, sheepskin farmers are relatively insensitive to price. It became 
apparent in interviews with merchants, and officials of the Ministry of Agriculture 
agreed, that farmers would sell their sheepskins to merchants at any price since there 
was no other way to get cash for the sheepskins,28 although they naturally try to find a 
merchant who offers the highest price.  
  
 Competition through utilizing social ties 
Despite this situation, the supplier’s price is closely matched to the international price. 
The question arises why the merchants are still competing with each other even though 
they have overwhelming superiority in negotiations with suppliers given the above 
conditions. One explanation is that the liberalization policy has brought enhanced 
competition between merchants. The negotiating style between merchants and suppliers, 
however, indicated a closely observed performance on both sides. Trading of sheepskins 
was specifically executed as follows. First, suppliers with sheepskins visit merchants 
one by one, asking their price. Then they withdraw, and in the place where merchants 
are buying will observe the negotiations of the merchants with other suppliers. 
Merchants would increase the price gradually and the suppliers sell skins when they 
thought the price reasonable.   
Given that they are keenly watched by their peers and competitors, it is difficult for 
merchants to collude among themselves. Apart from such straightforward negotiations, 
there are others, including informal contacts, such as woreda meetings, the bar and 
random meetings in the town. The author observed that merchants were often asked by 
local residents, who were suppliers as well, to explain why they bought at such a low 
price at a time of declining prices.29  
The hypothesis of social ties also explains why there are no Muslim sheepskin 
merchants in the Estie woreda. The majority of suppliers there, who are almost wholly 
Orthodox Christians (97 percent), may prefer dealing with Christian merchants for 
selling a product of which the price is unpredictable, rather than Muslim merchants who 
have weak social ties with them. This situation contrasts with that for other commodities 
where Muslim merchants are active, such as crops and honey, of which the prices are 
more predictable even for suppliers since the price basically fluctuates in line with 
seasonality and domestic supply and demand.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
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  If we focus only on the price trend in the sheepskin marketing channel in Ethiopia, 
there would appear to be the benefit of an efficient market. The research, however, 
revealed that participants in the channel tried to compensate for the inefficiency of the 
existing market by utilizing their social ties. 
 Private tannery plants sought to utilize their social ties to build a relationship of mutual 
trust with wholesalers. The participants in this trade have utilized social ties under 
circumstances in which the liberalization of private economic activities has been 
executed without legal enforcement, which would guarantee the fulfilment of a contract 
and forbid illegal collusion. State-owned plants can attract customers without social ties 
since they have already built up a solid relationship with wholesalers through time and 
through the security provided by government ownership. Private tanneries, on the other 
hand, have to rely on their social ties to compete with government-owned plants that are 
in a superior position to them. Suppliers in the rural areas also put some pressure on 
merchants to recognize social ties with the suppliers, other than in market terms. 
The function of social ties, however, is not always affirmative. In the research area, 
Muslims are excluded from the sheepskin marketing channel, probably because of their 
lack of social ties with the plant and the majority of the residents. Economic 
liberalization without appropriate support from the government might lead the 
Ethiopian economy to be developed on the basis of coalitions with social networks, and 
consequently the poor from outside the networks would be excluded. 
While the priority is to provide the appropriate infrastructure for communication and 
transportation, the reform of legal institutions to support the liberalization policy is also 
critical for further development. The World Bank has already conducted several projects 
to reform the law and legal institutions to underwrite the change from a state-command 
economy to a liberalized economy in various developing countries (Shihata 1997). An 
analysis of the role of laws in the ‘East Asian Miracle’ in East Asia has been also 
attempted (Pistor and Wellons 1998). Such lessons might be applicable to the Ethiopian 
legal system to build effective legal institutions.  
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NOTES 
1 The previous regime had also planned economic liberalization and announced its 1990 
Economic Reform Programme in March 1990. The programme, however, did not show 
clear results by the time of the collapse of the government in May 1991. 
2 The author was a visiting researcher of the Institute of Development Research (Addis 
Ababa University) from April 1997 through September 1999 under the Research Fellow 
Programme of the Institute of Developing Economies. 
3 The information regarding the volume is as of the 1988 Ethiopian fiscal year, based on 
unpublished information from the Ministries of Agriculture in Amhara Region, Oromia 
Region and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region. The administrative 
divisions have four levels, namely Region, Zone, Woreda and Qebele, in order of 
decreasing size. The Ethiopian fiscal year starts from 8 July. The plant visits followed 
personal appointments made by the author, and most of the merchants were introduced 
through the skins and hides expert of the Ministry of Agriculture in each woreda. 
4 See Kodama (1998) for cowhide marketing in Ethiopia. 
5 The number of interviewed wholesale merchants  (31) accounts for 4% of the 
Amhara Region (883 wholesalers) based on unpublished data from the Ministry of 
Agriculture of the Amhara Region. 
6 Based on unpublished data from the Ministry of Agriculture of the Amhara Region 
and the South Gondar Zone. 
7 Estimated data in 1999/2000 for the woreda total and the woreda town based on 
unpublished information in the woreda office, and 1998–9 for the qebele town based on 
author’s research. 
8 Based on unpublished data from the Agricultural Bureau of Estie woreda. 
9 The exchange rate had been fixed at $1 = 2.07 birr for 1973–91. From 1992, the 
exchange rate has been determined by auction. At August 2000, the exchange rate was 
$1 = 8.00 birr. 
10 The amount of salt for the contract is not strictly measured and is usually more than 
the necessary amount for a one-off delivery. 
11 Salt used to be a good incentive since the price of salt was once 300 birr/100 kg. 
Now it has become a supplementary incentive. The more important criteria for plant 
selection are quick payment and a reasonable purchasing price (author’s interview with 
a public tannery in August 1997). The system of salt payments is unlikely to disappear 
since all of the tannery plants currently give salt to wholesalers. 
12 The Ministry of Agriculture conducts training for wholesalers and collectors in 
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 preservation techniques for skins and hides. 
13 Author’s estimate based on CSA (1999d: 156, 159). The data include sheep and goat 
skins.  
14 The relationship between international buyers and tannery plants is not analysed in 
this paper, although it is one of the most important factors of price formation. It is a 
function of international economics and goes beyond the scope of this paper, which 
focuses on domestic aspects.  
15 In this paper, privatized tannery plants are not categorized with private tanneries. The 
situation of the privatized tanneries had not changed drastically from those of  
government-owned tanneries during the research period since privatised was of 
relatively recent date. 
16 Few of these tanneries on the waiting list actually launched a tannery business, 
probably owing to the sharp decline in the international price. As of 2002, only two 
tanneries had newly opened tanneries, besides the listed plants in Table 1 (author’s 
research).  
17 Data from the 1996/97 Ethiopian fiscal year (CSA 1998b) are used in this paper 
instead of the more recent data of 1997/98 (CSA 1999d). This is because the data of 
1997/98 include privatized plants. 
18 Most of the merchants interviewed were introduced by the Ministry of Agriculture in 
each area. This implies a biased selection. It seems, however, that the selection was 
biased towards long-established, successful merchants rather than newcomers. 
Therefore, the results of the interviews indicate that private tanneries have difficulties in 
competing with established merchants and they have to attract newcomers as their 
customers.    
19 There is no published research on the function of social ties in agricultural marketing, 
at least in the post-1991 period. In terms of utilizing social ties in the manufacturing 
sector, the research on informal leather shoe-making enterprises in Addis Ababa by 
Tebarek (1997) analyses in detail the relationship between an ethnic group (Gurage) and 
apprenticeship.     
20 The plant also has other ‘non-relative’ customers outside the woreda, although these 
customers are living around the owner’s home town. One of them claimed the reason 
why he chose the plant is that the owner was from the neighbouring area and he 
belonged to the Amhara ethnic group. 
21 The ban on exports of raw skins and hides in the late 1980s led to changes in the 
marketing structure since most skin and hide merchants had chosen to export directly 
rather than sell to domestic tannery plants before the ban (Befekadu and Tesfaye 1990: 
113). Merchants had exported raw skins and hides since this was much more profitable 
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 than sales to domestic tannery plants, which only offered fixed lower prices. With the 
export ban, the merchants were forced to sell their products to tannery plants. This 
contributed to keeping raw skins and hides for domestic processing. The value share of 
raw skins and hides in total skin and hide exports dropped from 40% in 1986 to 16% in 
1993. Although the effect of the ban is evident, the statistics are somewhat contradictory 
since the export data for 1993 still indicated the existence of raw skin and hide exports 
(Customs Authority 1994). 
22 In general most of the sheepskin merchants are male. There is a large capital 
requirement for entry into the sheepskin market and few women have sufficient capital. 
Female merchants interviewed were not financially independent from their father or 
husband. 
23 Some collectors also reside in big towns where vehicle transportation is available. 
The reason why they choose the status of collectors is that they do not have enough 
capital. 
24 It is difficult to know the reality in the other area given the short period of research. 
The Ministry of Agriculture in each area covers only merchants who live in the area and 
register with them. Most of the merchants interviewed were originally from the 
surrounding area. Some of them in the Southern Region, however, complained that 
‘outsiders’ would come to their town and purchase skins and hides at higher prices than 
theirs. 
25 For example, they should not eat meat slaughtered by the believers of the other 
religion, and nor do they celebrate the festivities of the other religion. 
26 See Kodama (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of the sheepskin price. 
27 This is only the available instance where it was possible to trace price changes in line 
with fluctuating trends in international prices after liberalization. After this time, there 
was another drastic price fluctuation in 2001 resulting from the worldwide shortage of 
sheepskin following the prevalence of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom. 
They earned 40 birr per skin at the peak of the domestic market, although the author 
was not able to conduct detailed research into this development. 
28 The other ways are home consumption or selling to a priest who specializes in 
tanning skins for bible-making. However, the demand for sheepskins for the former is 
limited to floor cushions and that for the latter is very small.  
29 Merchants usually do not understand the minutiae of the international market and 
offered vague comments such as ‘the price increased since there was a lot of rain in the 
world and the skins did not become dry’, or ‘the price decreased since the outsider [i.e. 
the author] brought bad luck to the sheepskins market’, so on. The latter answer sought 
to shift the responsibility for the low price to the author rather than accusing suppliers.   
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Fig.2  The marketing channel for sheepskins in Ethiopia 
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 Fig.3 Sheepskin export value and volume 1973-98
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 Fig.4 International price trend in sheepskins 1997-2000
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Fig.5 Short-term price trends at Estie over Easter 1998-2000
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 Table 1 Details of tannery plants visited
Owners' nationality Established year Current status Plant location
Government-owned tanneries
A Government 1926　by　Armenian Nationalized in 1974 Addis Abeba
B Government 1972 by French and Ethiopia Nationalized in 1976 Modjo, Oromia Region
C Government 1974 by Italian Nationalized on 1978 Combolcha, Amhara Region
D Government 1976 by the government No change Addis Abeba
Privatized tanneries
E Arabian 1927 by Armenian
Nationalized in1975,
privatized in 1998 Addis Abeba
F Arabian 1927 by unknown
Nationalized in1975,
privatized in 1997 Addis Abeba
Private tanneries
G Unknown* 1945 by Armenian
Tranferred to current
owner in 1972/3 Addis Abeba
H Ethiopian/Amhara 1990 No change Addis Abeba
I Ethiopian/unknown* 1994 No change Debre Zeit, Oromia Region
J Ethiopian/Amhara 1996 No change Haik, Amhara Region
K Ethiopian/Armenian Ethiopian 1996 No change Debre Zeit, Oromia Region
L Ethiopian/Gurage 1997 No change Modjo, Oromia Region
M Ethiopian/Amhara 1997 No change Mersa, Amhara Region
N Sudanese 1997 No change Sebeta, Oromia Region
O Ethiopian/Gurage 1998 No change Addis Abeba
* Refused to answer
Source: field survey  
 
Table 2 Details of merchants visited  
   
Region Wholesalers Retailers
Amhara Region 31 33
North Gondar Zone 2 3
South Gondar Zone 13 22
North Wollo Zone 3 1
South Wollo Zone 3 3
East Gojam Zone 9 2
West Gojam Zone 1 2
Southern Region 11 0
Gedeo Zone 11 0
Addis Abeba 1 0
Total 43 33
   
Source: field survey   
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 Table 3 Comparison of private and government-owned tanneries(1996/97 Ethiopian fiscal year
Private Government
N = 5 N = 6
Share of actual value of production (%) 23.1 76.8
Value added in the national account
concept/plant (at market price) (000 birr) 8668 14970
# of employees/plant 122 560
Paid-up capital/plant (000birr) 5520 11261
Source: CSA 1998b  
 
Table 4 A profile of registered skins and hides merchants in Estie Woreda 1998 
 
 
  Age Entry Other activities Notes 
Wholesalers 
A 60s 1965/6 
Licence 84/5 
Salt sales  
B 55 1977/8 Transportation, crop sales, 
oilseeds sales, Qes* 
A relative of the owner of 
Tannery H 
C 45 1979/80 Crop sales, 
construction materials sales 
A relative of the owner of 
Tannery H 
D Late 40s 1979/80 Coffee sales  
E 50 1979/80 Kerosene & motor oil sales A relative of the owner of 
Tannery H 
F Mid-50s 1980/1 Kiosk, bar A relative of the owner of 
Tannery H 
G 26 1993/4* Milling, kiosk, crop & spice 
sales, motor oil sales 
A relative of the owner of 
Tannery H 
H 18 1997/8(His father 
worked for skins in 
1973/4-1984/5) 
Father: hotel and crop & salt 
sales 
 
Collectors 
I 50-60s 1976/7 Unknown Sell to W/S merchants in Bahir 
Dar, who is the brother of the 
owner of Tannery H 
J Early 30s Unknown  
(at least after 1991 )
None Sell to W/S merchants in Estie 
*Qes is usually a priest whose livelihood is supported by another job, such as farming or trading. The 
Qes is respected by Orthodox Christians. 
 
Source: field survey 
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 Table 5 A profile of registered skins and hides Merchants in Jib Asra Town 1998 
 
  Licence Age Entry Other activities Notes 
Ａ Registered 50 1970/1 Farmland rental  Used to be W/S, now Collectors 
owning to the shortage of capital
Ｂ Registered 41 1979/80 Milling, farmland rental  
C Registered 33 1992/3 Tailor, milling, crop & 
oilseeds sales 
 
D Registered 57 1994/5 Farming, Qes* A relative of W/S C 
E Registered 23 1994/5 Tailor A relative of W/S C 
F Registered 30 1995/6 Milling A relative of W/S C 
Ｇ Unregistered Late 30s 1995 Tailor, tea room  
Ｈ Unregistered 41 After 1991 Farming, Chairman of the 
Qebele, Qes* 
A relative of W/S C 
 
*Qes is usually a priest whose livelihood is supported by another job, such as farming or trading. The 
Qes is respected by Orthodox Christians. 
 
Source: field survey 
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